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 Very little is known about the ownership structures of American corporations and even 
less about the influence different ownership structures have on a blockholder’s power in the firm. 
In this paper, we aim to fill these gaps in the literature. First, we provide a comprehensive 
description of ownership structures of US firms. Second, we show that due to differences in 
ownership structures, blockholders with similar ownership stakes may have a significantly 
different influence in the firm. Third, we develop a measure of the influence of the ownership 
structure on a blockholder’s power and show that an average blockholder can lose as much as 
12% of his potential power due to the presence and size of the ownership stakes of other 
blockholders. Fourth, we show that this influence of ownership structure varies systematically 
with a blockholder’s rank and identity, with the second and non-family manager blockholders 
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 Very little is known about the ownership structures of American corporations. In fact, 
until recently the dominant paradigm was that there are few blockholders present in US firms 
(see, e.g., Holderness, 2009; Gadhoum, Lang, and Young, 2005). Even less is known about the 
influence of different ownership structures on a blockholder’s power in the firm.1 In this paper, 
we aim to fill these gaps in the literature. First, we provide a comprehensive description of 
ownership structures of American corporations.2 Second, we show that, due to differences in 
ownership structures, blockholders with similar ownership stakes may have a significantly 
different power in the firm. Third, we show that the influence of ownership structure on a 
blockholder’s power varies systematically with her rank and identity. 
Consider the following three examples from our sample. First, on March 22, 1999, Qwest 
Communications International Inc., an S&P500-listed telecommunications company, had two 
blockholders. The company’s founder, Philip F. Anschutz, owned 45.7% of the outstanding shares 
and FMR Corp (Fidelity Management and Research Corp), owned 6.2%. Second, as of May 15, 
2003, the ownership structure of eLinear Inc. (information technology solutions provider founded 
in 1995) was as follows: Kevan M. Casey, President of the company, owned 45%; Tommy Allen, 
Senior Vice President and Director, 45%, and Jon V. Ludwig, CEO and Chairman of the board, 
6% of the shares. Third, as of March 8, 1996, General Dynamics, an S&P500-listed aerospace 
and defense company, had the following five blockholders. The Crown and Goodman families 
owned 12.9% of the outstanding shares, FMR Corp – 9%, Warren E. Buffett and affiliates – 7.7%, 
Delaware Management Holdings, Inc – 5.6%, and The Northern Trust Company, acting as the 
trustee of the General Dynamics Corporation Savings and Stock Investment Plan, – 9.5%.  
The above examples highlight some of the variation in the ownership structures of our 
sample firms. First, we find a large variation in the number of blockholders across firms – from 
                                                 
1 Throughout the paper we will use the terms power and influence interchangeably. 
2 Our definition of ownership structure includes two dimensions – the number of blockholders present in a 
firm and the size of their ownership stakes. 
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firms with no blockholders to firms with ten blockholders. Second, we show that, even after 
controlling for the number of blockholders, there is a large variation in the ownership stakes of 
various blockholders. These variations in the ownership structure have a direct and significant 
influence on the power wielded by a blockholder in a firm.  
Intuitively, the power of a particular blockholder depends upon two factors: (1) the size 
of her ownership stake and (2) ownership structure (i.e., the presence of other blockholders and 
the size of their ownership stakes). While power generally increases with the level of ownership, 
the ownership structure can either mitigate or magnify this influence. Compare, for example, the 
case of Mr. Anschutz with that of Mr. Casey in the Qwest Communications and eLinear 
examples, respectively. Both of them hold ownership stakes of similar size. Yet, it is clear that the 
power wielded by Mr. Anschutz is quite different from that wielded by Mr. Casey, due to the 
presence and size of the blocks held by Mr. Allen and Mr. Ludwig.  
In this paper, we use Shapley values (Milnor and Shapley, 1978) to measure the power 
wielded by each blockholder. In the Qwest Communications example, the founder’s ownership 
stake of 45.7% translates into power of 82.9%, while the FMR Corp’s 6.2% ownership stake 
yields only 0.8% power. This reflects the fact that the founder’s stake will, in most situations, 
have the dominant influence on the outcome of voting and therefore the influence of FMR Corp 
on the outcome will be minimal. In the eLinear Inc example, all three blockholders have equal 
power of 33.3% because any two of them can form a majority coalition. In this case, Mr. Casey 
and Mr. Allen lose from the ownership structure – their 45% ownership stakes translate into only 
33.3% power. Mr. Ludwig, the CEO of the firm, on the other hand, is the gainer from this – his 
6% stake translates into 33.3% power. Finally, the ownership structure described in the General 
Dynamics example leads to a distribution of power commensurate with the ownership stakes held 
by the blockholders. In particular, the power in this example ranges from 5.6% for Delaware 
Management Holdings, Inc to 14.2% for the Crown and Goodman families. To summarize, 
depending on the ownership structure, a particular individual may have either larger or smaller 
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power than warranted by her ownership stake.  
To identify the gainers and losers from the ownership structure, we introduce a new 
measure of the influence of ownership structure on power. In particular, for each blockholder in 
our sample, we calculate a Shapley value, assuming she is the only blockholder in the firm. This 
value, which we denote as the “benchmark Shapley value”, describes the power a blockholder 
would have based on just her ownership stake. The difference between actual and benchmark 
Shapley values, which we refer to as “loss of power”, measures a blockholder’s gain or loss of 
power due to the presence and ownership stakes of other blockholders. 3 
The earlier examples highlight two aspects of the loss of power we document in the 
paper. The first is related to a blockholder’s rank (based on the size of their ownership stake). The 
largest blockholders tend to experience a smaller loss of power, as compared to their lower-
ranked counterparts. The rank of shareholders below the largest also has a significant influence 
on the loss of power. The reason for this becomes clear when comparing the Qwest 
Communications and eLinear examples. The smallest blockholders in both examples hold 
approximately equal ownership stakes in their respective firms. Their power, however, varies 
significantly. FMR Corp, the second blockholder in the Qwest Communications example, has 
almost no power, while the ownership stake of CEO, the third blockholder in the eLinear 
example, becomes pivotal. This pattern – a significantly larger loss of power for the second 
blockholders as compared to their lower ranked counterparts – also holds for our sample firms in 
general.  
The second aspect is related to the identity of the blockholder.4 Most corporate 
blockholders tend to hold relatively small blocks and are usually present in firms that are 
                                                 
3 We chose to use the term loss of power because for most blockholders in our samples the difference 
between actual and benchmark Shapley values is negative. Only about 2% of blockholders gain from other 
blockholders’ presence and their ownership stakes.  
4 Two reasons for the potential differences in the loss of power between individual and corporate 
blockholders are liquidity and diversification considerations. We will discuss these considerations in detail 
in Section 3. 
4 
 
characterized by the absence of an exceptionally large block (e.g., Delaware Management 
Holdings in the General Dynamics example). The power they wield is therefore commensurate 
with their ownership stake, implying a small loss of power. In contrast, individual blockholders 
have far larger variation in the size of their holdings, ranging from the 45.7% block owned by 
Philip F. Anschutz to the 6% block owned by Jon V. Ludwig. Individual blockholders are also 
more likely to be present in a variety of ownership positions in a firm. They can be present as 
major (dominant) blockholders (like Mr. Anschutz in the Qwest example), as coequal 
blockholders (like Mr. Buffett in the General Dynamics example), or as minor blockholders (like 
Mr. Ludwig in the eLinear example). This variation in ownership stakes and ownership structures 
(e.g., the presence of a large blockholder) results in a larger variation in the loss of power 
experienced by the individual blockholders as compared to corporate ones. Once again, this 
pattern is representative of the broader sample, suggesting that the identity of the blockholder, 
corporate or individual, is related to the power they wield.5  
 Our paper contributes to several streams of literature. First is the literature on ownership 
structure of US firms.6 Until recently, the dominant paradigm regarding the ownership structure 
of US firms was that majority of them have dispersed ownership. This paradigm, which has 
recently been challenged by Holderness (2009), seems to be an outcome of two facts. First, most 
of the studies on US firms have focused almost exclusively on the large index-listed firms. It is, 
therefore, not surprising that such studies have found very few blockholders in the US firms. 
Second, the focus of the ownership structure literature (and ownership literature in general) has 
been on insider ownership. This has meant that the main focus has been on individual 
blockholders and very little is known about corporate blockholders.7 In this paper, we attempt to 
                                                 
5 Note that our objective here is not to explain why or how blockholders of a particular identity gain or lose 
power. Our objective is more modest – to identify blockholders who gain and lose from the presence and 
ownership stakes of other blockholders. 
6 See Cheffins and Bank (2009) for an excellent survey of this literature. 
7 The existing literature on the presence (and influence) of institutional shareholders has mostly treated 
them as a unified block (see, e.g., McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Kim and Lu, 2011).  
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remedy these two biases by looking at two widely different, hand-collected samples of US firms – 
newly-public and S&P500-listed ones – and by looking at all blockholders.8 Further, since our 
samples are hand-collected, they do not suffer from many of the problems documented by 
Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers, and Metrick (2006) that are inherent in the off-the-shelf 
databases. 
 Another feature of the ownership structure literature has been its focus on the largest (the 
controlling) shareholder or on the aggregate blockholder (insider) ownership. Only recently have 
researchers started looking at blockholders beyond the largest and at their role and importance in 
the firm.9 We contribute to this literature by providing a detailed description of the number of 
blockholders as well as their ownership stakes and identity for our two samples of US firms.10 
 We also contribute to the literature on the differences between ownership and power. A 
number of studies recognize this difference and use Shapley value to capture the voting power of 
a particular blockholder (see, e.g., Eckbo and Verma, 1994; Baker and Gompers, 1999). Other 
studies in finance use Shapley value as a measure of dispersion between the ownership stakes of 
the largest and the second largest blockholders (see, e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2008; Maury and 
Pajuste, 2005), or as a probability of a control contest (see, e.g., Nenova, 2003; Zingales, 1994). 
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to explicitly study the difference between ownership and 
power. We link this difference to the ownership structure and show that it is related to the rank 
and identity of the blockholder.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in this 
study.  Section 3 provides the empirical tests and discusses the results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
                                                 
8 Our approach allows us to identify all corporate blockholders, not just the institutional ones found in the 
Thompson 13F database. 
9 Using European data, Laeven and Levine (2009) show that firms with a multiple blockholders have a 
higher value relative to other firms. Konijn, Kräussl, and Lucas (2011) show that the dispersion of 
blockholder ownership stakes has a significant influence on firm value. 
10 Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers, and Metrick (2006) report both the number of blockholders and their 
identity for their subsample of Execucomp firms. 
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2. Data and sample selection 
2.1. Sample selection 
To provide a comprehensive view of the ownership structures of American firms, we use 
two different samples of publicly-traded US firms – the newly public and the S&P 500-listed 
firms. These two samples represent two opposite ends of the spectrum with the first representing 
small and young firms and the second large and mature firms. The sample of newly public firms 
is obtained as follows. We start with all US IPOs of common equity between 1993 and 1996, 
obtained from the SDC/Platinum New Issues database.11 We eliminate REITs, closed-end funds, 
unit offerings, equity carve-outs, financial firms (those with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999), 
utilities, foreign firms, leveraged buyouts, and roll-ups. We also eliminate firms which are not 
found in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) or COMPUSTAT databases. Finally, 
we remove firms for which there is a discrepancy between the first date of trading provided by 
CRSP and SDC. We are left with a total of 1,448 firms.  
We then follow these firms for up to 12 years after the IPO or until delisting, whichever 
comes first. Panel A of Table 1 reports the distribution of our newly-public firm sample by post-
IPO year. Of the 1,448 firms at the time of IPO, 389 survive until the 12th listing anniversary. Our 
total sample consists of 11,179 firm-year observations with available ownership data.  
Our second sample consists of firms listed in the S&P500 index. We start with a list of 
S&P500 constituents as of December 31, 1992. We then eliminate utilities as well as financial and 
foreign firms. This leaves us with a sample of 395 firms, which we then track for up to 16 years 
or until delisting, whichever is earlier. Our total sample of S&P500 firms consists of 4,884 firm-
year observations with available ownership data. Panel B of Table 1 shows the distribution of 
these observations over time. 
                                                 
11 Our choice of 1993 to 1996 IPOs as the basis of our sample is motivated by two considerations. First, 
availability of pre-1993 IPO prospectuses on Thomson Research, our source of pre-Edgar filings, is limited. 
Second, to ensure that we have a sufficiently long (post-IPO) time-series, we choose to limit our sample to 
firms that went public before 1997. 
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Panel A of Table 2 describes characteristics of our sample firms. In terms of firm size, our 
median newly-public firm is between 25th and 50th percentile of all Compustat- and CRSP-listed 
firms. This holds true for all three measures of firm size – market capitalization, total assets, and 
sales. S&P500 firms, on the other hand, are close to the 95th percentile. In terms of growth 
opportunities (as measured by CapEx/Sales and R&D/Sales), median firms of both samples fall in 
the 2nd quartile. Newly-public firms are also in the 2nd quartile based on leverage and asset 
tangibility, while the S&P500-listed ones are in the 3rd quartile. 
 
2.2. Blockholders and ownership 
We define a blockholder as any entity owning more than 5% voting rights as reported in 
the proxy statements.12 We classify each blockholder as either individual or corporate. We classify 
a blockholder as an individual if shares are either held directly by her or by an organization 
controlled by her (or members of her family). All other blockholders are classified as corporate. 
For each individual blockholder, we collect data on ownership stake, involvement in the 
management and governance of the firm, and status as a founder or a member of the founding 
family. We identify founders of newly-public sample firms (and their family members) using 
information in the management and ownership sections of IPO prospectuses and subsequent 
proxy statements. Founders of the S&P500 sample firms, their descendants, and family members 
are identified using Hoover’s Company Profiles and company websites. We treat ownership 
stakes held by all family members as one block.13 We also further sub-classify each individual 
non-family blockholder based on her involvement in the management of the firm. Following 
governance literature, we consider an individual blockholder involved (not involved) in the 
management of the firm to be a management (an outside) blockholder. 
                                                 
12 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations require the disclosure of ownership positions of 
(1) all officers and directors and (2) all shareholders holding more than 5% of any class of shares.  
13 Ownership stakes of family members are added together even if their individual ownership stakes fall 
below 5% of voting rights.  
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To classify corporate blockholders, we first try to identify them in CRSP, Thomson 13F, 
and VentureXpert databases, or in various issues of Pratt’s Guide to Venture Capital Resources. If 
a blockholder could not be found in either of these sources, we use Factiva and general internet 
searches by the blockholder’s name. Based on the information collected, we classify corporate 
blockholders into the following categories. A corporate blockholder is classified as a financial 
institution if it operates in a financial industry. A corporate blockholder is classified as a 
manufacturing corporation if it belongs to a non-financial industry. Venture capital or private 
equity blockholders are those who are found in either VentureXpert database or in Pratt’s Guide. 
Employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) are those identified as such in the proxy statements. 
Corporate blockholders that do not belong to any of the groups discussed above are classified as 
“other”.14 
 
3. Empirical tests and results 
3.1. Ownership structure 
Panel B of Table 2 provides summary statistics on the number of blockholders and their 
total ownership in our sample firms. In the newly public sample, the maximum number of 
blockholders is ten, with the mean (median) of 2.98 (3). The corresponding number for the 
S&P500 sample is nine, with the mean (median) of 1.90 (2). The mean (median) total blockholder 
ownership in the newly public sample is 43.45% (43.2%), while in the S&P500 sample it is 
20.24% (17.55%). These percentages are similar to those reported in prior studies. For example, 
the total blockholder ownership in our newly-public firm sample is similar to that reported by 
Holderness (2009) in his study of a random sample of publicly traded US firms. A similar 
blockholder ownership for the index-listed firms has been reported by, among others, Dlugosz, 
Fahlenbrach, Gompers, and Metrick (2006). 
In Panel C of Table 2, we report summary statistics at the firm-year-blockholder level. In 
                                                 
14 This category represents 4.55% (4.57%) of corporate blockholders in the newly-public (S&P500) sample. 
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the newly-public sample, about 39% (61%) of all blockholders are individuals (corporations) who 
own, on average, 20.1% (10.9%) of the firm. Median ownership stakes of the individual and 
corporate blockholders are 12.4% and 8.2%, respectively. In the S&P500 sample, by contrast, 
almost 15% (85%) of the blockholders are individuals (corporations) who own, on average, 
21.5% (9%) of the firm. Median ownership stakes of the individual and corporate blockholders 
are 13.1% and 7.6%, respectively.  
Overall, two main patterns emerge from Table 2. First, as far as the number of 
blockholders is concerned, individual blockholders tend to dominate in the newly-public firms, 
while corporate blockholders tend to dominate in the S&P500-listed firms. Further, if individual 
blockholders are present, they tend to have larger ownership stakes as compared to corporate 
blockholders. This is true for both samples. It should, however, be noted that in an average 
S&P500 firm, individual blockholders hold markedly lower ownership stakes as compared to 
corporate blockholders. In other words, it is only conditional on individual blockholder presence 
that they own a larger ownership stake. 
In Table 3 we describe the ownership structure of the newly public and S&P500-listed 
firms along two dimensions – the number of blockholders and the size of ownership stakes of 
various blockholders. Panel A (B) describes ownership structure of newly-public (S&P500) firms. 
As can be seen from the second columns of both panels of Table 3, blockholders are far less 
prevalent in the S&P500 firms. In the newly-public sample, 2.3% of firm-years do not have any 
blockholder, while the same is true for as many as 19% of S&P500 firms. Further, there is a 
significant variation in the number of blockholders in each sample of firms. Firms with more than 
three blockholders account for around a third of newly-public firms in our sample, but only for 
about an eighth of S&P500 sample firms. 
The largest blockholder, if present, controls, on average, 26% (15%) of the votes in a 
newly-public (S&P500) firm. Not surprisingly, the ownership stake of the largest blockholder 
declines with the presence of additional blockholders. This decline, however, is more pronounced 
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for the newly-public firms. For the S&P500 firms, the ownership stake of the largest blockholder 
remains remarkably stable for firms with three or more blockholders. Such a stability of the 
ownership stakes is also present for blockholders other than the largest. In particular, their 
ownership stakes have a tendency to increase with the number of blockholders present in the firm. 
For example, the average ownership of the blockholders ranked third increases from 7.4% to 
9.1% in the newly public sample and from 6.4 to 8.7% in the S&P500 sample.  
There is also a significant degree of variation in the ownership stakes of blockholders 
even when keeping the number of blockholders constant. For example, the size of the second 
blockholder’s ownership stake in the newly-public firms with two blockholders ranges from 5% 
to 49.2%. The corresponding range for the S&P500 firms is 5% to 27.3%. A similar variation is 
present in firms with more than two blockholders, but the range is smaller.  
As alluded to in the introduction, various blockholders are likely to have different 
preferences, which may lead them to choose different ownership stakes and different ownership 
structures. This suggests that the identity of a blockholder might be another important dimension 
of ownership structure. We describe the identity of blockholders in Table 4. In Panel A, we 
describe the identity of blockholders in the newly public firms. Almost a half of all individual 
blockholders in the newly public sample are founding families, while the remainder are managers 
and outsiders in almost equal proportions. A majority of the individual blockholders hold 
ownership stakes between 5% and 15%, with the exception of founding families who are also 
present in significant numbers in higher ownership brackets. The dominant types of corporate 
blockholders in the newly public firms are financial institutions (62.2%), venture capitalists 
(24.1%), and manufacturing firms (8.8%). A striking difference between the three types of 
blockholders emerges when comparing their ownership stakes. In particular, financial institutions 
rarely hold ownership stakes above 25%, while manufacturing firms and venture capitalists do 
hold stakes in this range. 
As can be seen from Panel B of Table 4, families represent 67.8% of all individual 
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blockholders in the S&P500 firms, while outsiders account for 23.9%. Managers, on the other 
hand, are rarely present as blockholders in the S&P500 firms – they represent only 8.3% of all 
individual blockholders. The distribution of ownership stakes held by various blockholders is 
similar to that observed for the newly public firms – families are present in all ownership brackets 
while the ownership stakes of managers and outsiders are rarely above 25%. The dominant types 
of corporate blockholders in the S&P500 firms are financial institutions (86.6%) and ESOPs 
(7%). While the ownership stakes of financial institutions in the S&P500 firms are, as in the case 
of newly public firms, mostly below 15%, a sizable fraction of ESOPs hold shares above this 
level. 
Overall, three main conclusions emerge from the above discussion. First, there is a large 
variation in the number of blockholders in both samples. Second, there is a large variation in the 
ownership stake of blockholders even after controlling for the number of blockholders. Third, we 
find a significant variation in the identity of individual blockholders, both across the ownership 
brackets as well as across the two samples. 
 
3.2. Shapley value 
Our findings of a significant variation in the number of blockholders and the size of their 
ownership stakes described above suggest that the ownership stake of a particular blockholder 
may not be a good measure of the actual power she has in the firm. Obviously, the extent of a 
blockholder’s influence in a firm is hardly observable. To formally capture this influence, we 
need a measure that captures two factors: (1) the size of the blockholder’s ownership stake, and 
(2) the presence and size of other blockholders’ ownership stakes. Shapley and Shubik (1954) 
provides such an a priori measure of power for each blockholder in a decision making body. In 
this paper, we use the oceanic formulation of Shapley value developed by Milnor and Shapley 




Shapley value calculation transforms the voting rights of a player into the capacity of that 
particular player to change the outcome of a voting session. In other words, the power of a 
particular player is defined as the percentage of times she casts the decisive vote. The oceanic 
formulation of Shapley value used in this paper also allows us to account for the widely-held 
portion of the voting rights. For example, a 10% blockholder has a Shapley value of 11.1% when 
the other 90% of voting rights are widely-held. The same 10% blockholder has Shapley value of 
33.3% when there are two other blockholders with 45% stakes each.  
 
3.3. Shapley value and ownership 
We now analyze the relationship between Shapley value and blockholder ownership. 
Table 5 reports the Shapley value for blockholders in both samples controlling for the level of 
ownership. In the newly-public sample, the minimum Shapley value for ownership levels of less 
than 40% is zero while the maximum Shapley value starts from 33% and after a small decline 
moves up to 66%. Small Shapley values are for minority blockholders in the presence of a very 
large (majority) blockholder, similar to the Qwest Communications Inc example. Maximum 
Shapley values at small ownership levels are minority blockholders that become pivotal between 
two large blockholders, similar to the eLinear Inc example. The range of Shapley values for a 
particular level of ownership is increasing, up to ownership levels close to 50%. In particular, for 
our sample firms an ownership level of 5% implies possible Shapley values between zero and 
33%. Note that the nonlinear relationship between ownership and Shapley value is first 
exponential (for ownership stakes of less than 50%) and then becomes a flat line at 100%, since a 
blockholder with more than 50% ownership stake has complete control regardless of her exact 
ownership stake (i.e., such blockholders have Shapley value equal to one). This nonlinear 
relationship is illustrated in Figure 1. Examination of the S&P500 sample reveals a similar 
pattern, which is illustrated in Figure 2. 
The relationship between Shapley value and ownership stake reported in Table 5 is 
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consistent with our initial conjecture that variation in the ownership structure leads to a 
significant variation in the power of a particular blockholder, even when controlling for her level 
of ownership. In other words, there are blockholders who have power higher than that warranted 
by the size of their ownership stake and there are blockholders who have significantly less power 
than warranted by their ownership stake. This leads us to the question we address in the 
remainder of this section – who gains and who loses from the ownership structure? To answer this 
question, we need a measure that captures the influence of the ownership structure on a 
blockholder’s power. We develop such a measure in the next subsection. 
 
3.4. Benchmark Shapley value, ownership, and loss of power 
As described above, we measure the loss of power (LP) as the difference between actual 
and benchmark Shapley values. Before proceeding, we would like to note two issues concerning 
our measure of the loss of power. First, the magnitude of the loss of power depends upon the level 
of the blockholder’s ownership. By construction, the maximum loss of power at a particular level 
of ownership is equal to the benchmark Shapley value at that level. This implies that the 
maximum loss of power is increasing with the level of ownership. To reflect this dependency, we 
control for the level of blockholder’s ownership in all of the subsequent tests. Second, also by 
construction, the loss of power for firms with only one blockholder is zero. This implies that 
inclusion of firms with a lone blockholder would bias downward our estimates of the loss of 
power. Therefore, from now on we will focus only on firms with at least two blockholders (i.e., 
the firms with non-zero loss of power). 
Panels A and B of Table 6 summarizes the loss of power for the newly-public and 
S&P500 samples, respectively.15 Several patterns emerge from Table 6. First, both the mean and 
the median LP are negative for all levels of ownership suggesting that most blockholders lose 
                                                 
15 For the sake of brevity, from now on we will report all the univariate tests using five different ownership 
brackets. The results are qualitatively unchanged when we split the ownership into the 18 different brackets 
used in Table 5. 
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power due to the presence and the size of ownership stakes of other blockholders. This is not 
surprising since we have defined our benchmark based on the absence of additional blockholders, 
which intuitively translates into less competition and thus greater power for the blockholder in 
question. Second, both the mean and the median loss of power are statistically significantly 
different from zero for both samples for all ownership brackets. Third, the loss of power accounts 
for approximately 13.2% (4.8%) of the benchmark Shapley value for the newly public (S&P500) 
firms. This implies that, on average, the presence and ownership stakes of other blockholders 
reduce a blockholder’s potential power by this percentage. Fourth, LP is decreasing until 
ownership reaches 50%.16 Fifth, blockholders who gain from ownership structure (i.e., those with 
positive LP) are those that own between 5% and 25% of a firm. Beyond 25% ownership the 
maximum LP is zero, indicating that none of blockholders gains from ownership structure after 
this level of ownership. Sixth, a comparison of loss of power between the two samples reveals 
that blockholders in the S&P500 firms lose less power as compared to their newly-public 
counterparts. In unreported tests, we find that the mean and median loss of power in the newly-
public firms is statistically significantly greater than that in their S&P500-listed counterparts for 
all ownership brackets. This might be due to the smaller number and total ownership of 
blockholders in the S&P500 firms.  
 
3.5. Loss of power and rank 
In this section, we examine the influence of the blockholder’s rank on her loss of power. 
We start by examining this influence in a univariate setting. For the sake of brevity, we combine 
third largest blockholders and those ranked below into a single group. The results of the tests of 
differences in the loss of power for blockholders of different ranks are provided in Table 7. The 
results for the newly public firms, reported in Panel A, suggests that second blockholders 
                                                 
16 Note that, by construction, loss of power is zero for any ownership stake above 50% because such 
blockholders always have a Shapley value of one and the presence of additional blockholders has no 
influence on their power. 
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experience a significantly higher loss of power, compared to both the first as well as the lower-
ranked blockholders. The average difference in the loss of power between the first and second 
blockholders ranges from 1.7% for the blockholders in the 5% to 15% ownership bracket to 33% 
in the 35% to 50% bracket. All differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. We also 
find that blockholders ranked third and below experience a larger loss of power relative to the 
first blockholders, but smaller relative to the second blockholders. Again, all differences are 
statistically significant at the 1% level.17 Similar patterns also hold for the S&P500 firms (see 
Panel B of Table 7). 
We now examine the influence of a blockholder’s rank on her loss of power in a 




















Following Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), we use a breakpoint at 25% ownership.18 
Own5to25 is equal to the blockholder ownership if the ownership is below 25% or equal to 25% 
if the ownership is above 25%. Own25to50 is equal to zero if the ownership is below 25%, equal 
to ownership minus 25% if the ownership is between 25% and 50%, or equal to 50% if the 
ownership is above 50%. As discussed earlier, loss of power for blockholders with ownership 
stakes above 50% is, by definition, zero. Thus, for this ownership range, LP does not vary with 
ownership and therefore, for all subsequent tests, we will use only observations with ownership 
less than 50%. As before, we also exclude all observations for which the loss of power is zero 
(i.e., firm-years with only one blockholder). We use two rank-related variables. Second is a 
dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the blockholder is ranked second in a particular 
                                                 
17 The significantly greater loss of power experienced by the second blockholders means that they lose 
more of their potential power. If an average largest blockholder loses 5.2% of her benchmark Shapley 
value, the second blockholders, on average, lose 23% of their potential power (results not reported). 
Blockholders ranked third and below lose, on average, 12.1% of their potential power. 
18 We have also used breakpoints at 20%, 30%, and 35% ownership stakes. The results are qualitatively 
unchanged in these alternative specifications. 
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firm-year, and zero otherwise. Likewise, Third is a dummy that takes on a value of one if the 
blockholder is ranked below the second in a particular firm-year, and zero otherwise. If, as 
predicted, second blockholders are associated with a larger loss of power, we would expect the 
coefficient estimates of Own5to25*Second and Own25to50*Second to be negative.  
 The results of the estimation of Eq. (1) are reported in columns (1) of Panels A and B of 
Table 8 for the newly-public and S&P500 firms, respectively. For the largest blockholder, 
consistent with the results of the univariate tests reported in Table 6, we find a negative 
relationship between the ownership stake of a blockholder and her loss of power. The coefficient 
estimates of Own5to25 and Own25to50 are negative and statistically significant for both samples. 
The magnitude of the coefficient estimates of Own25to50 is smaller than that of Own5to25 
suggesting a non-linear relationship between the ownership and loss of power. This negative 
relationship between the loss of power and a blockholder’s ownership stake is even more 
pronounced for the second-largest blockholders. In particular, we find that the coefficient 
estimates of Own5to25*Second and Own25to50*Second are negative and statistically significant 
for both samples. Overall, our results suggest that the second blockholders indeed lose 
significantly more than do the largest.  
Differences between mean and median loss of power reported in Table 6 implies that the 
distribution of LP is skewed. This suggests a possibility that our results may be driven by outliers. 
To address this potential concern, we exclude observations for which Shapley value is zero. 
Since, by construction, these are the observations that have the highest loss of power for each 
ownership range, by excluding them we are removing some of the extreme observations. We re-
estimate Eq. (1) using this reduced sample. The results are reported in columns (2) of both panels 
of Table 8 for the newly-public and S&P500 firms. The results are qualitatively similar, but the 
adjusted R-squares are higher than those reported in columns (1) of Panels A and B of Table 8. 
It can be argued that our results might be influenced by the following two biases. First, 
since firms with relatively more blockholders are over-represented in our dataset, they may 
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unduly influence our results. Second, due to the panel nature of our dataset, it is likely that a 
certain degree of autocorrelation exists between multiple observations of the same blockholder 
over different years. This, in turn, may lead to inflated t-statistics. We address these potential 
concerns by clustering standard errors at the firm level, as suggested by Petersen (2008). Columns 
(3) of Panels A and B of Table 8 report the coefficient estimates and the adjusted t-statistics. As 
expected, the adjustment reduces the significance of some of the coefficient estimates but does 
not qualitatively change our results. 
So far we have focused only on the influence of ownership and identity on the loss of 
power. It is possible, however, that firm-specific characteristics, such as firm size, leverage, and 
asset tangibility, are also related to ownership structure. For example, large firms are less likely to 
have large blockholders, ceteris paribus. Firms with more tangible assets may find it easier to 
fund the new projects using debt rather than equity (Myers, 1977). Higher extent of debt 
financing will lead to a lower dilution and therefore larger ownership stakes in such a firm. Such 
differences in the ownership structure, in turn, can influence the loss of power. In columns (4) of 
Panels A and B of Table 8, we report the results of the re-estimation of Eq. (1) with firm-specific 
control variables. Overall, the inclusion of the firm-specific variables does not qualitatively 
change either the significance or the magnitude of the estimated coefficients of interest. 
Finally, our main results presented so far have been based on a piecewise linear OLS 
specification. We have re-estimated Eq. (1) using a quadratic specification. The results are 
reported in columns (5) of Panels A and B of Table 8 for the newly-public and S&P500 samples, 
respectively. Our conclusions remain qualitatively unchanged in this alternative specification. In 
particular, we find that the second blockholders lose more power, as compared to the largest ones, 
for almost the entire ownership range.19  
 
 
                                                 
19 Note that the inflection points implied by the results reported in columns (1) and (2) of Panel A of Table 
11 are 9.7% and 7%, respectively. 
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3.6. Loss of power and identity 
The identity of a blockholder can also have a significant influence on the loss of power. 
In particular, there are two important dimensions along which individual and corporate 
blockholders are likely to be different when it comes to the sensitivity to the loss of power. The 
first of these is related to portfolio diversification. A majority of corporate blockholders are 
subject to a limit on how much of a firm’s equity they can own.20 As a result, they are effectively 
limited in their ability to hold an undiversified portfolio. Individual blockholders are, in general, 
not subject to such restrictions and therefore able to trade-off any potential costs arising from an 
undiversified portfolio with any benefits accruing from higher power (i.e. lower loss of power). 
To put it differently, due to the existence of this trade-off, individual investors are likely to be 
more sensitive to a loss of power as compared to corporate blockholders. This implies that 
individual blockholders will have a smaller loss of power, relative to corporate blockholders. 
The second dimension pertains to the liquidity of the portfolio firm’s stock. Corporate 
blockholders are more likely to have a short-term focus relative to individual blockholders.
21
 This 
implies that corporate blockholders are more sensitive to the costs associated with an illiquid 
block (see Bodie, Kane, and Marcus, 2010). Longer holding periods of individual blockholders, 
on the other hand, make them less sensitive to the illiquidity. Since the presence of a large 
blockholder impedes liquidity of a firm’s stock (see, e.g., Brockman, Chung, and Yan, 2009), 
corporate blockholders are less likely to acquire equity stakes in such firms. By definition, an 
increase in the ownership stake of the largest blockholder results in lower power of all other 
blockholders. Therefore, a smaller size of the largest block, ceteris paribus, implies a lower loss 
                                                 
20 There are external limits to the percentage of a portfolio company’s shares certain corporate blockholders 
can own. For example, the prudent man rule (or its more modern form, the prudent investor rule) as 
implemented in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 requires pension plans to diversify 
their assets. As specified in the Investment Company Act of 1940, in order to be considered diversified, at 
least three-fourths of a corporate blockholder’s portfolio must be invested such that he does not own more 
than 10% of the securities of a particular firm.  
21 This has been suggested by, among others, Graves and Waddock (1990) and Coffee (1991). We confirm 
this to be the case for our sample firms. In particular, holding period for an average individual blockholder 
in our sample is 6.5 years, while for corporate blockholders it is only 2.2 years. 
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of power for corporate blockholders. This suggests that due to liquidity considerations corporate 
blockholders will have a smaller loss of power, relative to individual blockholders.  
The relative importance of the diversification and liquidity effects over various levels of 
blockholder ownership is an empirical matter. We are not aware of any study, either theoretical or 
empirical, that has examined the relationship between blockholder identity and the loss of power. 
Our aim here is to provide preliminary evidence on this relationship.  
In Table 9, we examine the differences in the loss of power between individual and 
corporate blockholders in a univariate setting. The results for the newly public firms, reported in 
Panel A, suggests that for ownership stakes below 35%, the individual blockholders experience a 
significantly larger loss of power as compared to the corporate ones. The mean and median 
differences are statistically significant at the 1% level for all but one test. The smaller loss of 
power experienced by the corporate blockholders in this ownership range is consistent with the 
notion that such blockholders, for diversification and liquidity reasons discussed above, tend to 
hold small stakes and avoid firms with a large individual blockholder. 
For ownership stakes above 35%, however, corporate blockholders experience a 
significantly larger loss of power. The results for the S&P500 firms, reported in Panel B of Table 
9, are qualitatively similar, but the small sample sizes for corporate blockholders with ownership 
stakes above 25% make the results less reliable. In this ownership range our findings are 
consistent with the need for higher power as a compensation for the higher costs arising from an 
individual blockholder’s undiversified portfolio.22  
We now examine the differences in the loss of power between individual and corporate 
blockholders using the following regressions specification: 
                                                 
22 Note also that, as reported in Table 4, the identity of corporate blockholders with the intermediate levels 
of ownership is significantly different from that of blockholders with low levels of ownership. In particular, 
there are very few financial institutions with intermediate levels of ownership. The motivation of, for 
example, manufacturing corporations is likely to be different from that of financial institutions. 
Manufacturing corporations may acquire a block in a firm to secure more favorable transfer pricing or to 














2110  (2) 
The results of the estimation of Eq. (2) are reported in columns (1) and (8) of Panel A of 
Table 10 for the newly-public and S&P500 firms, respectively. We find that the coefficient 
estimates of Own5to25*ID are negative and statistically significant for both samples. This 
suggests that, for a given level of ownership, individual blockholders lose more power as 
compared to corporate blockholders. The coefficient estimate of Own25to50*ID, however, is 
positive and statistically significant for both samples. This suggests that, at intermediate levels of 
ownership, individual blockholders tend to lose less power relative to corporate blockholders.  
We further examine if our conclusions regarding the influence of a blockholder’s identity 
on her loss of power hold for various types of individual and corporate blockholders. We first 
compare the relationship between ownership and loss of power for each type of individual 
blockholder (family, managers, and outsiders) with that for all corporate blockholders. The results 
of these comparisons are reported in columns (2) to (4) and (9) to (11) of Panel A of Table 10 for 
the newly public and S&P500 samples, respectively.23 We find that all coefficient estimates of 
Own5to25*ID are positive and statistically significant, except for outsiders in the S&P500 sample 
(column (11)). The coefficient estimates of Own25to50*ID are all positive and significant, expect 
for managers in the newly public firms. Overall, the results for different types of individual 
blockholders are mostly consistent with those reported in columns (1) and (8) of Panel A.  
We now compare the relationship between ownership and the loss of power for each type 
of corporate blockholder (financial institutions, manufacturing firms, private equity firms (in the 
newly public sample), and ESOPs (in the S&P500 sample)) with that for all individual 
blockholders. The results are reported in columns (5) to (7) and (12) to (14) of Panel A of Table 
10 for the newly public and S&P500 samples, respectively. We find that all coefficient estimates 
                                                 
23 We do not interpret the coefficient estimates that have been estimated from fewer than 30 observations 
(as disclosed in Table 4). 
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of Own5to25*ID are positive and statistically significant. The coefficient estimates of 
Own25to50*ID for manufacturing and private equity firms in the newly public sample are both 
negative, but it is significant only for the former. Overall, the results are generally consistent 
across different types of corporate blockholders.  
Overall, we find that a blockholder’s identity has a significant influence on the 
relationship between her ownership stake and the loss of power, with individual (corporate) 
blockholders losing more power at low (intermediate) levels of ownership. These general patterns 
also hold for most types of individual and corporate blockholders. While there appear to be 
differences between types of blockholders, examination of their significance and the underlying 
reasons behind them are beyond the scope of the paper. 
As before, we also test the robustness of our results to the exclusion of observations with 
zero Shapley values, to clustering of observations, to additional firm-specific control variables, 
and to the use of a quadratic specification. 24 The results of these tests, reported in Panel B of 
Table 10, are qualitatively similar to those reported in Panel A of Table 10. 
 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
Although blockholder ownership has been considered an important element of corporate 
governance, very few researchers have directly examined the prevalence and implications of 
blockholder presence in US firms. In this paper, we start by showing that US firms have a wide 
spectrum of ownership structures – from firms with no blockholders to firms with ten 
blockholders and from firms with total blockholder ownership of 5% to 99.7%. We then go 
beyond looking at the ownership stake of blockholders and specifically address the difference 
between ownership and power. In particular, we show that the above variation in the ownership 
structure leads to a large variation in the power a particular blockholder has in the firm. For 
                                                 
24 For the sake of brevity, we report only the results of robustness tests based on the specifications reported 
in columns (1) and (8) of Panel A of Table 10. The results of other specifications are similar and are 
available from the authors upon request. 
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example, a 5% blockholder can have a power anywhere between zero and 33%, depending on the 
presence and ownership of other blockholders in the firm.  
We then develop a measure of the influence the ownership structure has on a 
blockholder’s power and show that an average blockholder loses up to 12.5% of his potential 
power due to the presence and ownership stakes of other blockholders. Finally, we show that the 
loss of power varies systematically with two observable blockholder characteristics – rank and 
identity. In particular, we identify groups of blockholders that are more likely to lose power, such 
as second blockholders and non-family managers. 
Our paper has several important implications for the field of corporate governance. First, 
the significant loss of power documented in this paper suggests a need to look beyond the 
ownership stakes of various blockholders (or groups thereof). This is especially important as a 
large body of research in finance has tended to view ownership and power as synonymous. For 
example, a central issue in the extensive literature on the relationship between ownership and 
firm value is that of entrenchment – the point at which a blockholder gains sufficient power to be 
able to extract rents or otherwise expropriate minority shareholders. Intuitively, entrenchment 
depends on power of which, as we have shown, ownership is but an imperfect proxy. 
Second, our findings provide future researchers with a better idea of the limitations of the 
assumption that ownership is equal to power. In particular, it suggests specific cases when the 
difference between ownership and power is likely to be especially pronounced. This difference, 
and therefore, the need to control for it, will be more pronounced for studies looking at the 
entrenchment of a single blockholder (e.g., a firm’s CEO as opposed to a group of blockholders, 
such as firm insiders), especially if the blockholder is not the largest one in the firm and is not a 
founder or a member of founding family. Further, the need to distinguish between ownership and 
power is likely to be more important for studies that use either a random sample or that of smaller 
and younger firms.  
Third, our findings may provide a better understanding of the driving forces behind the 
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results of the recent studies documenting the influence of both the number of blockholders and 
the dispersion of their ownership stakes on firm value. In particular, our findings suggest an 
intuitive interpretation of the prior results: that dispersion and the number of blockholders are but 
two factors that influence a blockholder’s power.  
Fourth, our findings of a significant influence of a blockholder’s identity on the loss of 
power suggest fruitful avenues for future research that may provide new insights into the 
uniqueness of some blockholders. For example, the growing literature on family ownership (see, 
e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003; and Villalonga and Amit, 2006) is built on the assumption that 
family blockholders are unique in the disproportionate amount of power they wield in a firm. The 
preliminary evidence reported in this paper suggests that their unique influence could be driven 
by the ownership structure differences between family and non-family firms as reflected in a 
lower loss of power experienced by the family blockholders.  
Finally, several caveats are in order: our treatment of blockholders does not take into 
account the potential alliances between blockholders, nor do we think that such consideration is 
viable. The purpose of this work is to merely distinguish between the power and ownership and to 
shed light on any systematic patterns in the difference between the two. Moreover, in the absence 
of much research specifically addressing blockholder ownership and power, we largely confine 
ourselves to describing the nature of blockholder ownership and power. As a result, any 
investigation into the genesis of the ownership and power structures that we observe falls beyond 











Own5to25 Equal to blockholder ownership if the ownership is below 25% or equal to 25% 
if the ownership is above 25%. 
Own25to50 Equal to zero if the ownership is below 25%, equal to ownership minus 25% if 
the ownership is between 25% and 50%, or equal to 50% if the ownership is 
above 50%. 
Own Equal to the blockholder ownership. 
Own2 Equal to the blockholder ownership squared. 
Ind A dummy variable that is equal to one for individual blockholders. 
Family A dummy variable that is equal to one for individual blockholders with family 
connections to the founder of the firm. 
Mangmt A dummy variable that is equal to one for individual blockholders that are 
managers in the firm 
Outsider A dummy variable that is equal to one for individual blockholders that are 
neither family nor managers of the firm 
Corp A dummy variable that is equal to one for corporate blockholders. 
Manuf A dummy variable that is equal to one for public or private corporate 
blockholders in non-finance industries. 
ESOP A dummy variable that is equal to one for corporate blockholders that are 
identified as Employee Stock Ownership Plan in the proxy statement. 
Fin Inst A dummy variable that is equal to one for corporate blockholders in financial 
industries. 
PE A dummy variable that is equal to one for private equity or venture capital 
corporate blockholders. 
Second A dummy variable that is equal to one for the second-largest blockholder in the 
firm 
Third A dummy variable that is equal to one for a blockholder ranked below second in 
the firm (i.e. third, fourth, etc. blockholders) 
Market 
Capitalization 
Total number of shares outstanding multiplied by the closing price of the year. 
LnAssets Natural logarithm of the book value of assets (data 6) 
Sales Total turnover/sales. 
PPE/Assets Total property, plant, and equipment (data 8) divided by the book value of assets 
(data 6) 
Debt/Assets The book value of debt (data 9 + data 34) divided by the book value of assets 
(data 6) 
CapEx/Sale Capital expenditure divided by total sales. 






Shapley value calculations 
 
Let N be a finite set of major players and v(S) be a voting game where S denotes a set of 
players supporting the resolution (also called coalition) and w(S) denotes their total votes. Let n 
represents the number of major players in the game, and s represents the number of major players 













Player i, who is not a part of coalition S, is said to be decisive if cSwwc i  )( . The 
power of player i is then defined by Shapiro and Shapley (1978) as the of the total number of 














 Milnor and Shapley (1978) extends this definition to the limiting case of a set of major 
players, N as before, and a continuum of non-atomic minor players, with a total weight of
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Figure 1 - Shapley value vs. ownership in the newly-public sample 
The mean Shapley value is calculated for each 5% ownership bracket. Mean, maximum, and minimum values are based on those reported in Table 5. Deviations 








































Figure 2 - Shapley value vs. ownership in the S&P500 sample 
The mean Shapley value is calculated for each 5% ownership bracket. Mean, maximum, and minimum values are based on those reported in Table 5. Deviations 










































Table 1 - Sample selection and distribution of newly public and S&P500 firms by year 
The newly public firm sample consists of all US firms that went public between 1993 and 1996, obtained from the 
SDC/Platinum New Issues database. We eliminate REITs, closed-end funds, unit offerings, equity carve-outs, financial 
firms (those with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999), utilities, foreign firms, leveraged buyouts, and roll-ups. We also 
eliminate firms which are not found in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) or COMPUSTAT databases. 
Finally, we remove firms for which there is a discrepancy between the first date of trading provided by CRSP and SDC. 
We are left with a total of 1,448 firms. These firms are then followed for up to 12 years after the IPO or until delisting, 
whichever comes first. The sample of the S&P500-listed firms consists of the index constituents as of December 31, 
1992, tracked for up to 16 years or delisting, whichever is earlier. We eliminate financial and foreign firms, as well as 
utilities. This leaves us with a sample 395 firms. 
 
Panel A: Distribution of firm-years with available ownership data by post-IPO year for the newly public sample 
 
  Post-IPO year   
IPO  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12  Total 




Panel B: Distribution of firm-years with available ownership data by year for the S&P500 sample 
 
Year   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16  Total 
28925 375 370 357 352 344 326 307 292 283 280 278 276 262 253 240  4,884 
 
  
                                                 
25 SEC EDGAR provides corporate filings beginning in 1993; however, the coverage for 1993 is limited. 
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Table 2 - Sample characteristics 
Panel A provides description of our sample firms by firm-year. All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The last 
two columns of Panel A report summary statistics for all of the Compustat- and CRSP-listed firms. Panel B reports the 
number of blockholders and their total ownership. In Panel B, firm-years with no blockholders are counted as having 
zero blockholder ownership. Panel C provides description of blockholder presence and ownership, based on their 
identity. 
 
Panel A: Firm characteristics 
  Newly-public firms  S&P500 firms  Compustat 
  Mean  
(Median) 
 Mean  
(Median) 




Market Capitalization  552.70  11,548.33  2,722.24 1,141.62 
  (116.21)  (4,084.50)  (298.98) (78.22) 
Total Assets  351.38  11,696.18  2,416.58 1,155.80 
  (90.74)  (4,436.96)  (256.86) (61.91) 
Sales  336.79  11,124.63  1,899.05 1,030.60 
  (88.70)  (4,844.75)  (241.04) (52.76) 
CapEx / Sales  0.177  0.058  0.133 0.107 
  (0.045)  (0.041)  (0.047) (0.023) 
R&D / Sales  0.601  0.024  0.617 0.169 
  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.051) (0.008) 
Debt / Assets  0.207  0.256  0.238 0.365 
  (0.103)  (0.245)  (0.199) (0.025) 
PPE / Assets  0.225  0.320  0.303 0.461 
  (0.145)  (0.275)  (0.224) (0.098) 
 
 
Panel B: Number of blockholders and their total ownership per firm-year 
   Newly-public firms  S&P500 firms 
Number of blockholders Maximum  10.00  9.00 
 75th percentile  4.00  3.00 
 Mean  2.98  1.90 
 Median  3.00  2.00 
 25th percentile  2.00  1.00 
Total blockholder ownership 75th percentile  59.60%  29.39% 
 Mean  43.45%  20.24% 
 Median  43.20%  17.55% 
 25th percentile  26.80%  6.43% 
 
 
Panel C: Blockholder characteristics 
   Newly-public firms  S&P500 firms 
Individual blockholders N  13,083  1,353 
 Percentage  (38.69%)  14.51% 
Individual ownership Mean  20.07%  20.48% 
 Median  (12.40%)  13.06% 
Corporate blockholders N  20,730  7,970 
 Percentage  (61.31%)  85.49% 
Corporate ownership Mean  10.91%  8.96% 
 Median  (8.20%)  7.60% 




Table 3 - Ownership structure of newly-public firms and S&P500 firms 
Each firm-year is categorized based on the number of blockholders. The number of firm-years in each category as well as the corresponding percentage (out of the overall sample) 
is reported in the first column. The mean, median, and range of blockholder ownership for each rank are reported next. Last row reports the mean and median blockholder 
ownership for each rank. 
 
Panel A: Ownership structure of newly-public firms 
 
  N   1st blockholder 2nd  blockholder 3rd  blockholder 4th blockholder 5th blockholder ≥6th blockholder 
No block  257         
  (2.30%)         
One block  1,956  Mean 40.13%      
  (17.50%)  Median (37.50%)      
    Range [5% - 99.72%]      
Two blocks  2,586  Mean 28.89% 10.25%     
  (23.13%)  Median (24.10%) (7.70%)     
    Range [5% - 92%] [5% - 49.23%]     
Three blocks  2,402  Mean 24.20% 11.42% 7.38%    
  (21.49%)  Median (20.20%) (9.47%) (6.35%)    
    Range [5.2% - 78.02%] [5% - 45%] [5% - 23.60%]    
Four blocks  1,889  Mean 20.09% 11.64% 8.52% 6.58%   
  (16.90%)  Median (16.80%) (10.20%) (7.56%) (5.95%)   
    Range [5.2% - 68%] [5.1% - 36%] [5% - 21.7%] [5% - 16.9%]   
Five blocks  1,142  Mean 18.40% 11.56% 8.98% 7.17% 5.94%  
  (10.22%)  Median (15.30%) (10.30%) (8.29%) (6.70%) (5.60%)  
    Range [5.7% - 65.07%] [5.4% - 38.4%] [5% - 22.85%] [5% - 18.9%] [5% - 14%]  
Six or more  947  Mean 17.04% 11.30% 9.10% 7.73% 6.74% 5.88%26 
  (8.47%)  Median (14.70%) (10.60%) (8.80%) (7.34%) (6.42%) (5.64%) 
    Range [6.6% - 61.8%] [5.7% - 32.3%] [5.3% - 21.8%] [5.05% - 17.3%] [5% - 14.8%] [5% - 12.5%] 
Total  11,179  N 10,922 8,967 6,379 3,978 2,089 1,478 
    Percent (97.70%) (80.21%) (57.06%) (35.58%) (18.69%) (13.22%) 
    Mean 26.23% 11.13% 8.26% 7.02% 6.30% 5.88% 
    Median (19.00%) (9.60%) (7.49%) (6.50%) (5.97%) (5.64%) 
 
                                                 
26 The mean, median, and range reported are based on 1478 blockholders in 947 firm-years that have more than six blockholders. 
32 
 
Panel B: Ownership structure of S&P500 firms 
 
  N   1st blockholder 2nd  blockholder 3rd  blockholder 4th blockholder 5th blockholder ≥6th blockholder 
No block  929         
  (19.02%)         
One block  1,184  Mean 17.49%      
  (24.24%)  Median (9.26%)      
    Range [5% - 87.13%]      
Two blocks  1,269  Mean 14.66% 7.56%     
  (25.98%)  Median (11.11%) (6.55%)     
    Range [5.07% - 73.73%] [5%  - 27.30%]     
Three blocks  805  Mean 12.77% 8.50% 6.41%    
  (16.48%)  Median (11.10%) (7.72%) (5.90%)    
    Range [5.46% - 62.19%] [5.02% - 33.39%] [5% - 15.51%]    
Four blocks  431  Mean 13.40% 9.01% 7.18% 6.00%   
  (8.82%)  Median (12.46%) (8.42%) (6.71%) (5.67%)   
    Range [5.99% - 64.08%] [5.16% - 22.03%] [5.02% - 18.25%] [5% - 10.11%]   
Five blocks  172  Mean 13.21% 9.49% 7.94% 6.76% 5.73%  
  (3.52%)  Median (12.16%) (8.91%) (7.77%) (6.44%) (5.46%)  
    Range [6.79% - 55.63%] [5.56% - 17.45%] [5.43% - 13.72%] [5.04% - 13.31%] [5% - 8.72%]  
Six or more  94  Mean 13.71% 10.33% 8.70% 7.58% 6.43% 5.78%27 
  (1.92%)  Median (12.87%) (9.99%) (8.37%) (7.33%) (6.24%) (5.48%) 
    Range [7% - 30.32%] [6.41% - 16.04%] [5.74% - 14.02%] [5.28% - 14.02%] [5.17% - 12.81%] [5.01% - 10.5%] 
Total  4,884  N 3,955 2,771 1,502 697 266 132 
    Percent (80.98%) (56.74%) (30.75%) (14.27%) (5.45%) (2.70%) 
    Mean 14.90% 8.27% 6.95% 6.40% 5.98% 5.78% 
    Median (10.97%) (7.47%) (6.45%) (5.97%) (5.66%) (5.48%) 
                                                 
27 The mean, median, and range reported are based on 132 blockholders in 94 firm-years that have more than six blockholders. 
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Table 4 - Blockholder identity and ownership  
The table reports the distribution of various types of blockholders by the level of their ownership. The percentages in the first five rows (reported in brackets) are calculated based 
on the total number of observations in each column. The percentages reported in the last row are based on the total sample. Family blockholders are founders and members of their 
families. Management (Mangmt) blockholders are non-family blockholders who are officers of the firm. Outside blockholders are non-family blockholders who are not officers of 
the firm. Financial institutional (FinIns) blockholders are those operating in a financial industry. Manufacturing (Manuf) blockholders are corporate blockholders that belong to a 
non-financial industry. Employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) blockholders are those identified as such in the proxy statements. Private equity (PE) blockholders are those found 
in either VentureXpert database or in Pratt’s guide. Corporate blockholders that do not belong to any of the other four groups are classified as “other”. 
 
Panel A: Blockholder ownership and identity in newly-public firms 
 
  Individual  Corporate 
Ownership  Total  Family Mangmt Outsider  Total  Fin Ins Manuf ESOP PE Other 
5 – 15%  7,525  2,750 2,071 2,704  17,717  12,212 1,247 40 3,644 574 
  (57.52%)  (42.09%) (64.44%) (81.06%)  (85.47%)  (94.64%) (68.71%) (58.82%) (72.88%) (60.81%) 
15 – 25%  2,316  1,320 616 380  1,836  668 287 8 727 146 
  (17.70%)  (20.21%) (19.17%) (11.39%)  (8.86%)  (5.18%) (15.81%) (11.76%) (14.54%) (15.47%) 
25 – 35%  1,050  706 243 101  569  20 131 8 292 118 
  (8.03%)  (10.81%) (7.56%) (3.03%)  (2.74%)  (0.16%) (7.22%) (11.76%) (5.84%) (12.50%) 
35 – 50%  910  699 111 100  380  1 95 7 225 52 
  (6.96%)  (10.70%) (3.45%) (3.00%)  (1.83%)  (0.01%) (5.23%) (10.29%) (4.50%) (5.51%) 
50 – 100%  1,282  1,058 173 51  228  2 55 5 112 54 
  (9.80%)  (16.19%) (5.38%) (1.53%)  (1.10%)  (0.02%) (3.03%) (7.35%) (2.24%) (5.72%) 
Total  13,083  6,533 3,214 3,336  20,730  12,903 1,815 68 5,000 944 




Panel B: Blockholder ownership and identity in S&P500 firms 
 
  Individual  Corporate 
Ownership  Total  Family Mangmt Outsider  Total  Fin Ins Manuf ESOP Other 
5 – 15%  761  446 73 242  7,492  6,706 95 419 272 
  (56.25%)  (48.64%) (64.60%) (74.92%)  (94.00%)  (97.19%) (65.52%) (74.69%) (74.73%) 
15 – 25%  261  187 11 63  380  194 21 131 34 
  (19.29%)  (20.39%) (9.73%) (19.50%)  (4.77%)  (2.81%) (14.48%) (23.35%) (9.34%) 
25 – 35%  90  79 6 5  52  0 13 7 32 
  (6.65%)  (8.62%) (5.31%) (1.55%)  (0.65%)  (0.00%) (8.97%) (1.25%) (8.79%) 
35 – 50%  110  101 7 2  21  0 15 2 4 
  (8.13%)  (11.01%) (6.19%) (0.62%)  (0.26%)  (0.00%) (10.34%) (0.36%) (1.10%) 
50 – 100%  131  104 16 11  25  0 1 2 22 
  (9.68%)  (11.34%) (14.16%) (3.41%)  (0.31%)  (0.00%) (0.69%) (0.36%) (6.04%) 
Total  1,353  917 113 323  7,970  6,900 145 561 364 




Table 5 - Shapley value and blockholder ownership 
Blockholders are categorized based on their ownership stake in the firm and the mean, median, and range of their Shapley values are reported for each sample.  
 
  Newly-public firms  S&P500 firms 
Ownership range  N Mean Median Minimum Maximum  N Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
5 – 10%  18,930 6.54% 6.54% 0.00% 33.33%  6,342 7.20% 6.89% 0.00% 12.51% 
10 – 15%  6,312 12.16% 12.41% 0.00% 33.33%  1,911 13.22% 13.15% 0.00% 24.07% 
15 – 20%  2,577 17.94% 18.69% 0.00% 28.65%  498 19.34% 19.61% 0.00% 30.25% 
20 – 25%  1,575 24.41% 25.39% 0.00% 39.04%  143 26.49% 27.28% 0.00% 33.20% 
25 – 30%  994 31.78% 33.22% 0.00% 42.65%  80 35.31% 36.50% 15.35% 42.68% 
30 – 35%  625 40.54% 43.19% 0.00% 53.61%  62 44.41% 46.35% 26.03% 53.80% 
35 – 40%  497 50.77% 54.08% 0.00% 66.56%  44 59.35% 60.75% 35.64% 66.19% 
40 – 45%  395 65.93% 68.05% 18.86% 81.55%  63 70.59% 69.01% 43.05% 81.34% 
45 – 50%  398 85.96% 87.50% 25.00% 100.00%  24 88.91% 87.95% 75.85% 99.45% 
50 – 55%  329 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%  26 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
55 – 60%  296 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%  14 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
60 – 65%  278 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%  13 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
65 – 70%  146 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%  37 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
70 – 75%  128 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%  22 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
75 – 80%  81 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%  26 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
80 – 85%  55 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%  13 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
85 – 90%  65 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%  5 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 




Table 6 - Shapley value and the loss of power  
For each ownership range, the means of Shapley and benchmark Shapley values are reported. For each blockholder, the benchmark Shapley value is calculated assuming that the 
particular blockholder is the only one in the firm. Loss of power is calculated as the difference between the actual and benchmark Shapley values. Observations for blockholders 
who are the only ones in a given firm-year are excluded. The last column reports the mean ratio of the loss of power to the benchmark Shapley value for each ownership range. The 
results of t-tests of the differences of mean from zero and nonparametric Wilcoxon tests of differences in medians from zero are reported. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Loss of power in newly-public firms  
 
  Shapley value  Loss of power 
Ownership range  N Actual Benchmark  Minimum 25th Percentile Mean Median 75th Percentile Maximum % Loss 
5 – 15%  24,589 7.90% 9.08%  -17.51% -0.98% -1.18%*** -0.45%*** -0.22% 26.95% -13.22% 
15 – 25%  3,985 20.24% 23.73%  -32.18% -3.51% -3.49%*** -1.71%*** -0.85% 7.64% -14.65% 
25 – 35%  1,497 34.61% 41.48%  -52.44% -9.99% -6.88%*** -3.60%*** -1.70% -0.19% -16.48% 
35 – 50%  1,055 63.96% 72.69%  -71.97% -10.58% -8.74%*** -4.49%*** -1.92% 0.00% -12.86% 
50 – 100%  731 100.00% 100.00%  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% - 
Total            -13.24% 
 
 
Panel B: Loss of power in S&P500 firms 
 
  Shapley value  Loss of power 
Ownership range  N Actual Benchmark  Minimum 25th Percentile Mean Median 75th Percentile Maximum % Loss 
5 – 15%  7,389 8.53% 8.94%  -14.52% -0.38% -0.40%*** -0.20%*** -0.10% 11.25% -4.57% 
15 – 25%  544 20.39% 22.15%  -25.58% -1.32% -1.76%*** -0.69%*** -0.31% 11.89% -7.59% 
25 – 35%  90 37.48% 42.59%  -27.44% -4.93% -5.11%*** -1.19%*** -0.60% -0.22% -11.94% 
35 – 50%  63 71.08% 75.04%  -30.53% -4.66% -3.96%*** -2.34%*** -1.03% -0.09% -5.58% 
50 – 100%  53 100.00% 100.00%  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% - 




Table 7 - Summary statistics of the loss of power by blockholder rank 
Mean and median loss of power for each ownership bracket is calculated based on all blockholders of particular rank in that ownership bracket. Ranks below the second are treated 
as a group. The results of t-tests of differences in means and nonparametric Wilcoxon tests of differences in medians are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Loss of power by rank in newly-public firms 
 
  First (F) Second (S) Third (T)  Difference 
  N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median  ∆Mean 
(F - S) 
∆Median 
(F - S) 
∆Mean 
(F - T) 
∆Median 
(F - T) 
∆Mean 
(S - T) 
∆Median 
(S - T) 
                  
5 – 15%  3,582 -0.31% -0.23% 7,369 -2.04% -0.63% 13,638 -0.95% -0.47%  1.73%*** 0.40%*** 0.64%*** 0.23%*** -1.09%*** -0.16%*** 
            (32.48) (41.02) (21.68) (41.13) (-32.20) (-14.83) 
15 – 25%  2,391 -1.39% -1.06% 1,308 -7.49% -4.36% 286 -2.74% -2.10%  6.10%*** 3.30%*** 1.35%*** 1.04%*** -4.75%*** -2.26%*** 
            (40.70) (40.45) (11.93) (9.73) (-10.80) (-12.54) 
25 – 35%  1,249 -4.71% -2.92% 248 -17.78% -15.87% 0 - -  13.07%*** 12.96%*** - - - - 
            (31.03) (20.52) - - - - 
35 – 50%  1,013 -7.43% -4.15% 42 -40.27% -37.11% 0 - -  32.84%*** 32.96%*** - - - - 
            (22.29) (10.53) - - - - 
50 – 100%  731 0.00% 0.00% 0 - - 0 - -  - - - - - - 
            - - - - - - 
Total  8,966 -1.99% -0.57% 8,967 -3.45% -0.93% 13,924 -0.98% -0.48%  1.46%*** 0.36%*** -1.01%*** -0.09%*** -2.47%*** -0.45%*** 
            (18.76) (23.66) (-23.86) (-4.77) (-45.76) (-32.34) 
 
Panel B: Loss of power by rank in S&P500 firms 
 
  First (F) Second (S) Third (T)  Difference 
  N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median  ∆Mean 
(F - S) 
∆Median 
(F - S) 
∆Mean 
(F - T) 
∆Median 
(F - T) 
∆Mean 
(S - T) 
∆Median 
(S - T) 
                  
5 – 15%  2,109 -0.19% -0.13% 2,685 -0.58% -0.20% 2,595 -0.40% -0.26%  0.39%*** 0.08%*** 0.21%*** 0.14%*** -0.18%*** 0.06%*** 
            (11.93) (16.06) (12.42) (26.37) (-5.65) (8.69) 
15 – 25%  467 -0.74% -0.58% 75 -8.27% -2.43% 2 5.31% 5.31%  7.53%*** 1.85%*** -6.05%*** -5.89% -13.58%** -7.74%** 
            (17.54) (12.79) (-10.84) (-0.37) (-2.07) (-2.32) 
25 – 35%  79 -3.21% -1.11% 11 -18.73% -17.13% 0 - -  15.52%*** 16.02%*** - - - - 
            (9.60) (5.05) - - - - 
35 – 50%  63 -3.96% -2.34% 0 - - 0 - -  - - - - - - 
            - - - - - - 
50 – 100%  53 0.00% 0.00% 0 - - 0 - -  - - - - - - 
            - - - - - - 
Total  2,771 -0.45% -0.16% 2,771 -0.86% -0.21% 2,597 -0.39% -0.26%  0.41%*** 0.05%*** -0.06%* 0.10%*** -0.47%*** 0.05%*** 
            (7.05) (8.41) (-1.94) (15.28) (-8.52) (6.55) 
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Table 8 - Loss of power and blockholder rank 
The dependent variable, LP, is the loss of power calculated for each blockholder. All observations with ownership 
greater than 50% are excluded. Columns (1) to (5) of Panel A report results for the newly-public firm samples, while 
those in Panel B report those for the S&P500 firm sample. Columns (1) of both panels, report the results estimated 
using a piecewise linear OLS regression with a 25% breakpoint. Samples in columns (2) of both panels exclude 
observations with Shapley value of zero. Columns (3) report the result of the estimations of OLS regressions with 
standard errors clustered by firm. Columns (4) report the results of the estimation of Eq. (1) with additional, firm-
specific control variables. Columns (5) report the results of the estimation of a quadratic specification of Eq. (1). All 
variables are as defined in the Appendix. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) standard errors are used in calculation of 
t-statistics that are reported in parentheses.***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Loss of power in newly-public firms 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
Own5to25  -0.2037*** -0.2040*** -0.2037*** -0.1985***  
  (-30.07) (-34.53) (-16.72) (-28.02)  
Own5to25 * Second  -0.2738*** -0.2620*** -0.2738*** -0.2782***  
  (-27.42) (-29.49) (-9.57) (-26.85)  
Own5to25 * Third  0.0403*** 0.0433*** 0.0402 0.0341**  
  (3.10) (3.80) (1.56) (2.53)  
Own25to50  -0.2350*** -0.2349*** -0.2350*** -0.2343***  
  (-31.66) (-36.29) (-7.46) (-30.40)  
Own25to50 * Second  -2.0666*** -2.0389*** -2.0666*** -2.0753***  
  (-65.43) (-72.54) (-20.40) (-63.35)  
Second  0.0017 0.0078*** 0.0017 0.0024 -0.0544*** 
  (1.19) (6.23) (0.58) (1.62) (-25.09) 
Third  -0.0176*** -0.0160*** -0.0176*** -0.0166*** -0.0195*** 
  (-12.49) (-12.90) (-7.92) (-11.33) (-7.19) 
LnAssets     0.0000  
     (0.27)  
PPE/Assets     -0.0096***  
     (-10.30)  
Debt/Assets     -0.0018***  
     (-5.20)  
CapEx/Sales     0.0000  
     (-0.52)  
R&D/Sales     0.0000  
     (1.09)  
Own      -0.2410*** 
      (-16.55) 
Own * Second      0.6934*** 
      (26.88) 
Own * Third      0.0225 
      (0.45) 
Own2      0.0448 
      (1.58) 
Own2 * Second      -3.5728*** 
      (-51.85) 
Own2 * Third      0.2293 
      (0.97) 
Constant  0.0198*** 0.0199*** 0.0198*** 0.0213*** 0.0241*** 
  (17.70) (20.35) (13.59) (16.08) (15.44) 
       
Observations  31,126 29,991 31,126 28,743 31,126 




Panel B: Loss of power in S&P500 firms 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
Own5to25  -0.0818*** -0.0818*** -0.0818*** -0.0823***  
  (-11.65) (-15.16) (-4.69) (-11.16)  
Own5to25 * Second  -0.3491*** -0.2195*** -0.3491** -0.3512***  
  (-28.11) (-22.30) (-2.55) (-27.22)  
Own5to25 * Third  -0.0063 -0.0145 -0.0063 -0.0036  
  (-0.31) (-0.94) (-0.13) (-0.17)  
Own25to50  -0.1623*** -0.1623*** -0.1623*** -0.1704***  
  (-13.60) (-17.70) (-3.27) (-13.63)  
Own25to50 * Second  -1.9152*** -2.3292*** -1.9152*** -1.8889***  
  (-17.49) (-27.57) (-4.27) (-17.07)  
Second  0.0209*** 0.0123*** 0.0209** 0.0211*** -0.0231*** 
  (16.60) (12.48) (2.05) (16.12) (-11.42) 
Third  -0.0045*** -0.0036*** -0.0045 -0.0045*** 0.0023 
  (-2.87) (-3.00) (-1.26) (-2.74) (0.53) 
LnAssets     0.0003**  
     (1.97)  
PPE/Assets     0.0004  
     (0.40)  
Debt/Assets     -0.0012  
     (-0.96)  
CapEx/Sales     0.0015  
     (0.44)  
R&D/Sales     0.0098**  
     (2.44)  
Own      -0.0515*** 
      (-3.67) 
Own * Second      0.5596*** 
      (17.20) 
Own * Third      -0.1753* 
      (-1.65) 
Own2      -0.1328*** 
      (-4.25) 
Own2 * Second      -4.0352*** 
      (-33.25) 
Own2 * Third      0.9942 
      (1.54) 
Constant  0.0064*** 0.0064*** 0.0064*** 0.0038** 0.0049*** 
  (7.22) (9.40) (3.51) (2.46) (3.98) 
       
Observations  8,086 8,019 8,086 7,621 8,086 




Table 9 - Summary statistics of the loss of power by blockholder identity 
Blockholders are categorized based on their identity as either individual or corporate. A blockholder is classified as an individual if shares are either held directly by her or by an 
organization controlled by her (or members of the family). All other blockholders are classified as corporate. Mean and median loss of power for each ownership bracket is 
calculated based on all blockholders of particular identity in that ownership bracket. The results of t-tests of differences in means and nonparametric Wilcoxon tests of differences 
in medians are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Loss of power by identity in newly-public firms 
 
  Individual (I)  Corporate (C)  Difference 
  N Mean Median  N Mean Median  ∆Mean (I - C) T-stat ∆Median (I - C) Z-stat 
5 – 15%  7,284 -1.36% -0.51%  17,305 -1.11% -0.43%  -0.25%*** (-7.98) -0.08%*** (-10.64) 
15 – 25%  2,201 -3.68% -1.83%  1,784 -3.25% -1.56%  -0.43%*** (-2.58) -0.27%*** (-4.69) 
25 – 35%  957 -7.23% -3.98%  540 -6.25% -3.12%  -0.98%** (-2.35) -0.86%*** (-3.55) 
35 – 50%  735 -8.16% -4.12%  320 -10.07% -5.46%  1.91%** (2.52) 1.34%*** (3.01) 
50 – 100%  608 0.00% 0.00%  123 0.00% 0.00%  - - - - 
Total  11,785 -2.62% -0.79%  20,072 -1.57% -0.49%  -1.05%*** (-21.55) -0.29%*** (-22.60) 
 
 
Panel B: Loss of power by identity in S&P500 firms 
 
  Individual (I)  Corporate (C)  Difference 
  N Mean Median  N Mean Median  ∆Mean (I - C) T-stat ∆Median (I - C) Z-stat 
5 – 15%  646 -0.89% -0.24%  6,743 -0.36% -0.20%  -0.53%*** (-12.80) -0.04%*** (-5.69) 
15 – 25%  212 -3.01% -0.76%  332 -0.95% -0.65%  -2.06%*** (-5.54) -0.11%*** (-2.91) 
25 – 35%  67 -6.44% -1.38%  23 -1.22% -1.11%  -5.22%*** (-3.17) -0.27%* (-1.90) 
35 – 50%  43 -4.02% -2.03%  20 -3.83% -2.53%  -0.19% (-0.14) 0.49% (1.23) 
50 – 100%  47 0.00% 0.00%  6 0.00% 0.00%  - - - - 




Table 10 - Loss of power and individual blockholder identity 
The dependent variable, LP, is the loss of power calculated for each blockholder. All models in Panel A are estimated using a piecewise linear OLS regression with a 25% 
breakpoint. All observations with ownership greater than 50% are excluded. Columns (1) to (7) of Panel A report results for the newly-public firm samples, while those in columns 
(8) to (14) report those for the S&P500 firm sample. Samples used in columns (2) to (4) and (9) to (11) of Panel A include all corporate blockholders and the type of individual 
blockholder indicated at the top of the column. Samples used in columns (5) to (7) and (12) to (14) of Panel A include all individual blockholders and the type of corporate 
blockholder indicated at the top of the column. Columns (1) to (4) of Panel B report results for the newly-public firm samples, while those in columns (5) to (8) of Panel B report 
those for the S&P500 firm sample. Samples in columns (1) and (5) of Panel B exclude observations with Shapley value of zero. Columns (2) and (6) of Panel B report the result of 
the estimations of OLS regressions with standard errors clustered by firm. Columns (3) and (7) report the results of the estimation of Eq. (2) with additional, firm-specific control 
variables. Columns (4) and (8) of Panel B report the results of the estimation of a quadratic specification of Eq. (2). All variables are as defined in the Appendix. 
Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) standard errors are used in calculation of t-statistics that are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Main tests 
 
  Newly-public sample  S&P500 sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
  Ind Family Mangmt Outsider Fin Ins Manuf PE  Ind Family Mangmt Outsider Fin Ins Manuf ESOP 
Own5to25  -0.1936*** -0.1936*** -0.1936*** -0.1936*** -0.2619*** -0.2619*** -0.2619***  -0.0534*** -0.0534*** -0.0534*** -0.0534*** -0.2226*** -0.2226*** -0.2226*** 
  (-31.59) (-32.51) (-34.58) (-36.63) (-44.18) (-33.88) (-37.68)  (-8.78) (-10.02) (-14.26) (-14.07) (-21.85) (-9.50) (-10.94) 
Own5to25 * ID  -0.0683*** -0.0600*** -0.1053*** -0.0914*** 0.1085*** 0.0767*** 0.0328**  -0.1692*** -0.2148*** -0.3306*** 0.0110 0.1675*** 0.1822** 0.1736*** 
  (-7.84) (-5.67) (-8.47) (-6.95) (9.54) (3.42) (2.40)  (-14.65) (-17.57) (-17.58) (0.85) (13.21) (2.00) (4.30) 
Own25to50  -0.3377*** -0.3377*** -0.3377*** -0.3377*** -0.1295*** -0.1295*** -0.1295***  -0.1139*** -0.1139*** -0.1139*** -0.1139*** -0.0186 -0.0186 -0.0186 
  (-24.42) (-25.13) (-26.73) (-28.31) (-13.95) (-10.70) (-11.90)  (-5.72) (-6.53) (-9.29) (-9.17) (-1.07) (-0.46) (-0.53) 
Own25to50 * ID  0.2082*** 0.2178*** 0.0290 0.1652*** -0.1697 -0.4409*** -0.0140  0.0954*** 0.1896*** 0.2389*** -1.6714*** - -0.1379 0.0409 
  (12.33) (12.47) (1.05) (6.01) (-0.96) (-11.75) (-0.58)  (3.66) (7.96) (6.15) (-33.49) - (-1.35) (0.35) 
Constant  0.0045*** 0.0045*** 0.0045*** 0.0045*** 0.0086*** 0.0086*** 0.0086***  0.0007 0.0007 0.0007** 0.0007** 0.0100*** 0.0100*** 0.0100*** 
  (6.97) (7.18) (7.63) (8.09) (10.87) (8.33) (9.27)  (1.27) (1.45) (2.06) (2.03) (7.47) (3.25) (3.74) 
ID_Dummy  0.0041*** 0.0079*** 0.0036** 0.0042*** -0.0078*** -0.0051* 0.0011  0.0093*** 0.0185*** 0.0053** -0.0088*** -0.0091*** -0.0136 -0.0099** 
  (3.95) (5.46) (2.31) (2.93) (-6.55) (-1.79) (0.61)  (6.62) (11.46) (2.34) (-5.85) (-6.10) (-1.31) (-1.99) 
Observations  31,126 25,018 22,852 23,154 23,740 12,879 15,943  8,086 7,720 7,211 7,391 7,206 1,082 1,420 
Adjusted R2  19.49% 18.79% 20.16% 18.59% 18.51% 19.43% 19.69%  16.13% 14.86% 20.70% 24.56% 15.97% 11.42% 13.29% 
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Panel B: Robustness tests 
 
  Newly-public sample  S&P500 sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
           
Own5to25  -0.1827*** -0.1936*** -0.1909***   -0.0526*** -0.0534*** -0.0528***  
  (-33.30) (-12.14) (-29.75)   (-11.06) (-6.97) (-8.35)  
Own5to25 * Ind  -0.0869*** -0.0683*** -0.0691***   -0.1235*** -0.1692 -0.1830***  
  (-11.14) (-2.95) (-7.62)   (-13.44) (-1.53) (-15.12)  
Own25to50  -0.3486*** -0.3377*** -0.3376***   -0.1171*** -0.1139** -0.1227***  
  (-28.43) (-4.22) (-23.32)   (-7.53) (-2.03) (-5.78)  
Own25to50 * 
Ind 
 0.2034*** 0.2082*** 0.2111***   0.0256 0.0954 0.1075***  
  (13.59) (2.85) (12.00)   (1.25) (0.69) (3.92)  
Constant  0.0065*** 0.0045*** 0.0063*** 0.0004  0.0010** 0.0007 -0.0034** -0.0006 
  (11.26) (3.35) (6.27) (0.37)  (2.35) (1.05) (-2.37) (-0.77) 
Ind  0.0068*** 0.0041** 0.0044*** 0.0135***  0.0080*** 0.0093 0.0106*** 0.0156*** 
  (7.26) (1.98) (4.02) (9.07)  (7.11) (0.98) (7.17) (7.89) 
LnAssets    0.0002     0.0004**  
    (1.55)     (2.46)  
PPE/Assets    -0.0127***     0.0016  
    (-11.50)     (1.32)  
Debt/Assets    -0.0021***     -0.0014  
    (-5.03)     (-1.07)  
CapEx/Sales    0.0000     0.0036  
    (-0.89)     (0.99)  
R&D/Sales    0.0000     0.0191***  
    (1.62)     (4.32)  
Own     -0.1156***     -0.0262** 
     (-8.64)     (-2.12) 
Own * Ind     -0.2373***     -0.2930*** 
     (-12.57)     (-11.92) 
Own2     -0.3005***     -0.1190*** 
     (-9.02)     (-3.21) 
Own2 * Ind     0.6147***     0.5048*** 
     (13.90)     (8.34) 
Observations  29,991 31,126 28,743 31,126  8,019 8,086 7,621 8,086 
Adjusted R2  24.54%  19.95% 19.60%  18.73%  17.27% 16.06% 
 
